The Balanced Development Coalition (BDC) gave residents of Chicago’s low-income, middle-income and gentrifying neighborhoods a voice in the creation of city housing policy and a seat at the table where policy decisions are made. The BDC was pulled together in late 2000, as a reaction to two things: the spread of gentrification throughout the communities of Chicago, and the lack of a coherent citywide organizing strategy to address the affordable housing crises. The membership of the BDC eventually grew to include sixteen diverse grassroots community organizations from across Chicago. All of the members were deliberately direct action grassroots organizations with some experience working on affordable housing issues.

The BDC brought thousands of formerly underrepresented residents of Chicago into the debate of how Chicago should address its growing affordable housing problem. The BDC created a vehicle for residents most affected by the loss of affordable housing to have the access necessary to influence city policy. The work of the coalition also increased the effectiveness of each individual organization and built alliances and relationships that should serve each member’s future interests and campaigns.

The BDC set out to bring non-traditional allies together to work on a common issue and through that collaboration, to improve and highlight community organizing in the City of Chicago. While sticking religiously to organizations with a base in the community and the ability to mobilize that base through public actions, BDC accomplished bringing together organizations that, because of network affiliations or ideology, had not previously worked together in such a sustained way.

The vehicle for this collaboration was the passage of a citywide affordable housing set aside policy.

The initial goal was to pass a housing policy requiring residential developments of 10 or more units to set aside 30% as moderately priced dwelling units. The first ordinance that was proposed called for a 25% set aside, and a new ordinance was proposed in March of 2004 for a 15% set aside. All of the proposals allowed for developers to have the option of making a contribution to the Chicago Low Income Housing Trust Fund (CLIHTF) in lieu of including affordable housing on site. The CLIHTF supports the preservation and development of rental housing that serves low and very low-income households.

An affordable housing set aside is a public/private partnership that requires the development community to become a partner in creating homes and communities affordable to a wide range of households. In 2000 and 2001, when the coalition was forming, the real estate market was so hot that a set aside was an obvious way to capture some of the benefits of that boom for low income and working people in Chicago.

The Formation of the Coalition

The Balanced Development Coalition started through some conversations between Sarah Jane Knoy at the Organization of the Northeast (ONE) and Nancy Aardema at Logan Square Neighborhood Association (LSNA) in mid-2000. Both organizations were struggling with local affordable housing organizing, and recognized the need to collaborate on issues that were large and pervasive. ONE leaders had started working to gain set aside commitments in local developments in Uptown, and had worked to build the Chicago Partnership for Affordable Neighborhoods (CPAN) program, along with Alderman Shiller, but it was not immediately clear that this would be the issue around which to collaborate.

ONE and LSNA leaders began meeting, and by the second discussion, Bickerdike Redevelopment Corporation (BRC), Lakeview Action Coalition (LAC) and Albany Park Neighborhood Association (APNC) were in attendance because of the gentrification already occurring in their communities, or the clear indications of the coming wave. At this point, the decision was made to form something outside of the advocacy community, and to only invite in grassroots organizations. Meetings were held at night. The leaders decided to work for a citywide set aside. West Town Leadership United (WTLU) joined the coalition.

It became obvious that to win a citywide ordinance, the Coalition would have to grow beyond obviously gentrifying communities. The Resurrection Project (TRP) was approached and joined. Organizations that were a part of the Chicago Capacity Building Initiative (CCBI) talked about the work of BDC, and some new members emerged from that group, including Target Area Development and ACORN. All of the early members were approached by either Nancy or Sarah Jane.

Other BDC members came in spurts throughout the campaign, some times because they were approached and other times because they sought BDC out. Occasionally a group that did not meet the criteria (community base, ability to mobilize) asked to join and instead we worked with them as allies. The entire BDC would vote on the inclusion of a new member.

How We Worked Together

Early on, the BDC created guidelines for participation requiring all member organizations to send one staff person and one or two community leaders to each monthly coalition meeting. We agreed that groups would strive to keep these attendees as consistent as possible, and community leaders would work with staff members of the coalition groups in developing agendas and facilitating meetings.

The decisions made in the initial development of the BDC solved two key problems for organizing collaborations: who gets into the collaboration and how do you distribute credit? BDC made intentional decisions about including groups that brought a constituency to the table, and we reached agreements about how to distribute media and press roles, as well as roles at key meetings with labor and religious allies, aldermanic leaders and other city officials. All BDC members had the opportunity to build organizational relationships that would help with future campaigns, and most members took advantage of those opportunities.

While it was not always convenient, BDC rotated meeting locations, and the host organization was responsible for developing the agenda for the meeting and chairing the meeting. This exemplified a commitment to de-centralization and to leadership-run organizations. By moving the chairpersonship around at the same time, we created a feeling of egalitarian principle that pervaded the work. Because dinner was shared at each meeting, relationships were built and, over time, trust developed.

Each member had to have the ability to mobilize its constituency when the coalition decided to organize public meetings and actions. We set individual and coalition goals and recorded and reflected upon our respective accomplishments.

BDC members discussed at length and voted on all key campaign tactics and strategies. Most votes reached full consensus, although a few passed with a strong majority. We developed an Action Committee and an Allies Committee. Those committees developed plans and strategies, but those plans were brought to the full coalition before they were implemented. Periodically throughout the campaign, we held retreats, strategy sessions and training. All of these activities were approved, developed and attended by the majority of the BDC members.

BDC was staffed by the staff and leaders from the member organizations exclusively, until the final year of the campaign. At that point, because it appeared that the campaign was heating up and we would need to be able to move more quickly and have someone working more aggressively in City Hall, the BDC members agreed to seek funding for staff. Supervision of the staff was divided among BDC member groups, and a structure was developed to make funding decision. Before a check could be cut for any new use, the entire coalition needed to meet and vote. All members had to be informed of the pending vote in advance of the meeting. In the last year of the campaign, the member organizations agreed that each member would be asked to make a $750 donation to BDC to cover costs, but membership was not based on the ability to pay. By the end of the campaign, most BDC member organizations had paid that $750, several organizations paying twice.

We developed the Chicago Housing Set Aside Working Group out of a previous group of allies that had been meeting about the set aside. While meeting attendees varied, the group typically included Business and Professional People in the Public Interest (BPI), the Metropolitan Tenants Organization (MTO), the Chicago Rehab Network (CRN), Interfaith Open Communities (IOC), Protestants for the Common Good (PCG), and representatives from the BDC. Alderman Preckwinkle and Alderman Burnett also often attended these meeting, which gave us the opportunity to check in with key allies and City Council leaders to discuss plans and strategies.

“The regular check-ins / strategy sessions were effective. It was important for us to know what the other was thinking especially in terms of strategies and actions. Even though we didn’t always see eye to eye, frequent communication was key to keeping the partnership strong.” (4^th Ward Alderman Toni Preckwinkle)

A number of our members convinced their local aldermen to implement housing set aside policies in their wards, resulting in hundreds of units of affordable housing that would otherwise have never been built. This significantly strengthened our advocacy efforts on the citywide level by demonstrating that set aside ordinances do not deter development nor undermine a municipality’s tax base.

Early in the campaign, the Mayor introduced the Affordable Requirements Ordinance (ARO) which made a haphazard practice into the law. Through this ARO, developers using TIF funds to build housing need to do a 20% set aside and developers getting discounted City land for a housing development need to do a 10% set aside. This was a huge victory that resulted almost immediately from the work of BDC. This was also an immediate example of a consistent potential danger we would face: distractions. At this point, the BDC decided that we were fighting for a broader set aside ordinance. Throughout the campaign, the Mayor threw out other distraction, including the Central District density bonus and Alderman Suarez’s Condo Conversion Task Force, and other housing issues constantly emerged, but BDC loyally stuck to fighting for the set aside.

Campaign Tactics

Direct Action

BDC’s main tactic was direct action. We held large public actions throughout the campaign, consistently turning out hundreds and, at times, thousands of Chicagoans to rallies, council meetings, briefings, and aldermanic offices. Our annual thousand plus rallies at City Hall proved effective, especially early in the campaign, as the coalition sought and gained recognition with elected officials, members of the media, and current and future allies and members.

Early in 2001, the BDC kicked off the public campaign with street theatre to elevate the discussions about the affordable housing crisis in Chicago. That summer BDC held our first 1,000 person (or more) march through downtown Chicago. Each summer, from 2001 until 2005, BDC brought large numbers of people to march on City Hall, once causing the closure of City Hall, once the closure of Michigan Avenue. Each year, the tactic was debated, and it was decided that BDC’s strength was in the production of Chicagoans, and that had to be demonstrated consistently. In the summer of 2006 (on the hottest day of the year), as aldermanic elections were coming down the pike, BDC members took a bus tour (a 4 bus tour) to visit 7 non-supporting aldermen. While the police started tailing us from Alderman Laurino’s office, Alderman Suarez’s office was the only place we were locked out of, despite the fact that it was his ward night.

At the same time, throughout the campaign, each BDC member organization was employing various tactics to pressure their aldermen into signing on to the ordinance and implementing a local set aside. This included six years of organization annual meetings, small leadership meetings, actions, and 2 aldermanic elections. Round one of the elections, in 2003, brought on new support for a 15% set aside from Aldermen Tunney and Mell, while we lost Aldermen Mitts, Solis and L. Thomas. All of the local actions were coordinated with the full BDC, but determined by the housing leaders at each organization.

BDC leaders attended and at times disrupted City Council, Housing and Zoning committee meetings. Again, these were strategic decisions based on who we determined needed to be targeted at the time, and opportunities that presented themselves. The amount of face to face time with elected officials was greatly enhanced by spending time were they gathered most, the halls and meeting rooms of City Hall.

We sponsored numerous well-attended press conferences with some of the City’s most powerful union, civic and religious leaders. We released reports showing the efficacy of balanced development set-aside policies. All of these actions supplied the leaders of the BDC tremendous learning opportunities in planning and implementing events, developing relationships and working with media, and event / campaign evaluation.

Developing and Working w/ Allies

During the campaign the BDC worked with many organizations outside of our membership. We started reaching out to labor early in the campaign. SEIU, The Chicago Federation of Labor, UFCW, HERE/UNITE, AFSCME and others played a big part in helping us educate and move City Council members on this issue. We kept the Building Trades in the loop throughout the campaign, understanding that they might feel threatened by a developer set aside requirement. Amongst the Building Trades, the Carpenters Union stood out in their support.

Our key religious and civic allies were also extremely important. They worked with us on strategy development, aldermanic meetings and most notably, direct actions.

“It was great working with the BDC. I felt as a coalition partner I knew what our roles was (bringing the faith community to the table) and what everyone involved in the campaign could and would produce.” (Rev. Jennifer Kottler, Protestants for the Common Good)

Business and Professional People for the Public Interest (BPI) was there every time we needed research, strategy analysis or expert testimony. On January 26, 2005, after months of phone calls put in by primarily Diane Limas from APNC, Alderman Suarez called for a City Council Housing and Real Estate Committee Hearing for supporters of the Set Aside proposal. Nick Brunick from BPI provided to main technical testimony supporting the ordinance and took a nearly two hour beating from Alderman Banks on the technical aspects of the ordinance. While community residents also testified, Nick really took the brunt of the abuse that seemed to be coming directly from the Mayor’s office.

BPI also supplied in-kind office space for the coalition’s staff member that was brought on to help coordinate the final push. Their contributions to the passage of the Affordable Requirements Ordinance were significant.

“Working with a coalition with such diversity of communities, people, knowledge and experiences was exciting and educational. Seeing how you went about impacting city policy helped us develop a deeper understanding of how we can be more effective advocates.” (Adam Gross, BPI)

Working with City Hall / City Council

The campaign interacted with the City’s leadership on several levels. Our work put us in contact with leaders in the City Council, Daley Administration, Housing and Zoning Committees, and Department’s of Housing and Planning.

We develop very strong relationship with a number of City Council members, most notably the floor leaders in this campaign 4^th Ward Alderman Toni Preckwinkle, and 27^th Ward Alderman Walter Burnett.

“Very impressed with how you kept a citywide coalition going for five plus years. Your victories were significant, but came over long stretches of time. Other coalitions would have been hard pressed to keep going for so long.” (4^th Ward Alderman Toni Preckwinkle)

BDC members and BDC as a whole met with public officials and civic leaders to educate them about the needs and benefits of having a balanced approach to community development. We surveyed entire wards to show specific aldermen the level of support for balanced development in their own back yards. In the end, it was not the logic of the argument that moved these leaders, it was the power demonstrated through years of public actions and sustained political pressure.

We organized public meetings and invited national, state and city officials to testify and publicly demonstrate their support for a citywide set aside ordinance. We sought out and met with many of the City’s top commissioners and members of the Mayor’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs.

We created an environment so aldermen could/would work with their colleagues on the floor of the city council doing roll calls, implementing a “defer and publish” motion, and voting in favor of two amendments that the City wanted no part of. In the end, Mayor Daley went from a position of “no mandates” to a citywide policy making Chicago the largest city in the nation with an affordable housing set aside ordinance.

Using Local Elections

Strategy was sometimes developed month to month, while in a few cases, we were able to work well in advance of key opportunities in order to take advantage of those moments. The mobilization around the spring 2007 citywide elections, the tactic that likely won the set aside, was planned for at least a year in advance. In January of 2006, BDC held a training on the nuts and bolts of electoral work. Many member organizations had experience using this tactic, and we knew that the unions would also be focusing on the elections. During the remainder of that winter, while we sustained a campaign of bird-dogging the Mayor at public appearances and holding up affordable housing signs, BDC members where determining local capacity and interest in running local referenda or petition drives or other mobilization efforts.

A referendum put on the ballot by the Alderman in the 35^th ward also occupied our time.

On March 21, 2006, a balanced development referendum was on the ballot in all precincts in the 35^th Ward. Led by LSNA, the BDC worked for weeks talking to voters in the ward, and, as a result, 77% voted in favor of a citywide balanced development policy.

In the summer of 2006, with the help of SEIU, BDC held a planning retreat where member organizations laid out the work they were committed to doing for the November 2006 elections. The plan was to use these elections to deliver a warning to many already vulnerable aldermen. The months’ leading up to the November elections was when the Mayor announced his proposed expansion of the ARO – the set aside that passed in May 2007.

On November 7, 2006, the balanced development referendum appeared in a number of precincts in the 39^th and 43^rd wards, sponsored by APNC and LAC respectively. 77% of the voters in the 39^th Ward supported the referendum, as did 66% of the voters in the 43^rd Ward. Petition drives were going on simultaneously in several northwest side wards. Alderman Reboyras was moved towards support by the work of Logan Square Neighborhood Association and Bickerdike Redevelopment Corp. In the end, he stood with us.

The electoral work was continued through the winter as the aldermanic races heated up with candidate’s forums and other door to door voter education on the issue of affordable housing. Affordable housing was a key issue in most of the contested wards, and many independent aldermen won in the February election or the April run-off. When the Mayor called a special City Council meeting on May 14^th, 2007 to pass his Expanded ARO, it was a maneuver designed to avoid a vote from the new, more independent city council, which was seated on May 21^st.

Reflections and Analysis

The first word that comes to mind for many when they think of the BDC is “action.” The greatest sustaining factor for many involved with the campaign was the fact that BDC took action again and again. The BDC encouraged local groups to come up with their own actions, and the coalition members were there to support local initiatives. This grassroots work was essential in building participation in the citywide actions. The large citywide actions were fueled by these local campaigns. These actions received attention of the general public, local alderman as well as the Mayor’s office.

The planning and work that went into these actions helped to develop strong working relationships within the coalition. These actions were well organized and mobilized large numbers of people. They incorporated union, civic and religious allies and delivered a clear message.

The local political landscape changed tremendously during, and in part because of, the campaign. The greatest example of this was the administration’s rush to get its affordable housing ordinance passed in May 2007 before the new council members were sworn in. Ultimately, the administration went from “never supporting a mandatory set aside policy” to introducing their own.

It is obvious that without the broad level of pressure exerted by the BDC, change would not have taken place. The BDC worked for change in Chicago’s approach to affordable housing and along the way, built alliances that will continue to affect power in Chicago.

Victories and Recommendations

After six years of actions, rallies, meetings with aldermen, and educating communities, on May 14, 2007, the City Council passed Mayor Daley’s Expanded Affordable Requirements Ordinance (ARO) which mandates an affordable housing set aside for the City of Chicago. As a coalition, BDC achieved the near impossible: forcing Mayor Daley to support a mandatory housing set aside policy for working families, which he vowed he would never do. The BDC elevated the level of organizing in Chicago and has changed the balance of power.

The New Affordable Requirements Ordinance:

In buildings of 10 or more units, 10% of the units will be set aside as affordable; this applies to developments that need zoning changes from non-residential to residential, an increase in density in residential developments, where city land is sold for residential developments, and in planned unit developments. What does this produce? The City has said that the ARO will create 1,000 units per year.
The targeted income is set at 60% Area Median Income (AMI) for rental housing and 100% AMI in for sale housing.
If the developer chooses not to create set-asides in the project being developed, s/he has to pay a fee in lieu in the amount of $100,000 per affordable unit not built to the Housing Opportunities Fund. A portion of this money is slated to help low-income renters (<30% AMI) throughout Chicago. How much money? If developers opt for the in lieu of payment in half of the 1,000 set-aside units, up to $50 million dollars will be created for new affordable housing.
Our work has more than doubled the resources the city dedicates to affordable housing.
Chicago is now the largest city in the nation with a mandatory inclusionary housing policy.

Several member groups and their constituents had lengthy conversations about the significance of what was finally passed. Many asked, “Was it a victory?” From the time the Mayor made his public announcement in October 2006 and the ordinance was introduced in City Council the following month, to the final passage, the BDC worked to improve the ARO so that it would be in line with our original proposal. Aldermen were encouraged to introduce and support our two amendments which would have raised the set-aside percentage to 15% and lowered the targeted income of buyers to 80% of the AMI. While the two amendments did not pass the City Council, the BDC’s end-game organizing from October 2006 until May 2007 was incredibly valuable for several reasons.

It is widely understood that the Mayor announced the Expanded ARO to give political cover to some aldermen who were about to begin their re-election campaigns and were vulnerable on local issues, including affordable housing. BDC did not make this an easy victory for him. We polarized until the moment the ARO passed on May 14, forcing aldermen to take a position, and the Mayor to cut deals with wavering aldermen. In the end, 11 aldermen stood with us to strengthen the ARO, which is obviously not the necessary 26, but 11 is significant discordance for a Mayor who is accustomed to unanimous victories. 7 days later, that independent block grew with the addition of several new independent aldermen. The ramifications of this are already being seen in the activities of the City Council.

Throughout the six years of the campaign, many additional victories were won, some which exceeded the points of the ordinance:

The Downtown Density Bonus which will create and preserve hundreds of affordable units through money allocated for the Chicago Low-Income Housing Trust Fund, targeted at households earning less than 30% AMI
20% affordable units will be set aside in developments utilizing TIF dollars
The creation of the Chicago Community Land Trust which will make all future affordable units developed affordable into perpetuity.
The strong leadership of Alderman Toni Preckwinkle (4^th) and Alderman Walter Burnett (27^th), who were champions of the issue for over five years; Aldermen Billy Ocasio (26^th), Alderman Manny Flores (1^st), Alderman Joe Moore (49^th) also demonstrated strong leadership over the course of the campaign.
Following the 2007 Municipal and Run-off elections, nine new aldermen where elected, most with affordable housing as a part of their platform.

Balanced Development Coalition members felt that the founding principles of the Coalition proved effective to accomplish our goals. The BDC was created to elevate the stature and quality of organizing in Chicago and to win a housing set-aside policy by building a powerful coalition whose member organizations were community-based, could turn out, and understood how to effectively use and challenge power. In sticking to the principles, BDC was successful on many fronts: each member organization benefited from all of the leadership development opportunities and they are stronger as a result. We clearly gained a seat at the table around housing issues. Coalition work is now pervasive in Chicago organizing culture and the power of community organizing is more widely understood. We succeeded in passing a set-aside ordinance and winning other key housing victories that will positively impact our communities.

Coalition members felt that the founding principles and organizing methods were effective. Throughout the campaign, it was vital that members remain committed and follow through on what they said they could and would do. For the most part, people felt this occurred, and we could not have won all that we did had that not been the case.

Particularly noted during the evaluation process was our consistent use of direct actions which were creative, fun, and instrumental in pressuring our elected officials and moving the campaign forward. People also talked about the opportunities that the elections provided and how much everyone learned while working on precinct and referendum activities.

Upon reflection, members felt that the decisions made to work within, rather than against, the existing process proved to be good strategy: Supporting Alderman Preckwinkle’s draft ordinance in December 2002; supporting the full ordinance in May 2004; and changing our focus from the Preckwinkle/Burnett ordinance to amending the City’s policy in the fall of 2006 all proved to be the right thing to do.

Throughout the campaign, staff and leaders learned a great deal about the power dynamics of the city which reaffirmed the crucial need to be continuously active in communities and challenge local aldermen to hold them accountable. The final three weeks of the campaign captured and heightened the dynamics of the campaign as a whole when the Coalition attended the long-awaited public hearing on the Mayor’s Ordinance on May 1, and forced the ordinance to be deferred and published which prevented the Mayor from calling for a vote on May 9. This was followed by the special City Council Meeting on May 14, called only for the purposed of voting on this issue and to force a vote prior to the swearing in of the newly elected City Council one week later. Coalition members learned a great deal about how the City Council really works, parliamentary procedure, aldermanic loyalties, what moves their specific aldermen, and the lengths to which the Mayor will go to retain power.

Recommendations for the Future:

While our victories were many, Coalition members also discussed areas in which we could have done things differently. At the end of the day, we did not have enough aldermen willing to vote for our amendments. Some members felt that we did not have groups or identified allies with a base in several of the wards represented by aldermen who did not vote for the amendments. Also, we might have been more successful had we directed more of our energy (tactics and time) at the Mayor and the Housing and Zoning Committee members.

Coalition members discussed areas where we could have been stronger in the final months and weeks of the campaign. For example, we needed more knowledge of legislative processes/strategies. Decisions at the end of the campaign were being developed at a fast pace, some without the involvement of enough players.

Some people discussed whether we strategized and planned far enough ahead. Our customary practice was to work month-to-month, with the exception of large rallies and scheduled election seasons. Some ideas were to have more strategy sessions or perhaps an annual retreat which would have helped us to plan ahead three to twelve months at a time, which may have served us well.

Finally, and most importantly, everyone agreed that we must continue to “Organize! Organize! Organize!” We must continue to build leaders who are at the forefront, driving the campaign. Aldermen must always know who they are accountable to, and regular contact must occur. We also recognize that the power base must be able to affect those who traditionally make the decisions: we must have a great enough breadth and capacity of groups throughout the City to impact citywide policy. And the people must never give up. In the end, the people were heard and the victory was ours.

The following organizations supplied key contributions of time and resources which greatly assisted the BDC’s efforts to win an affordable housing set aside ordinance for the residents of Chicago.

- The Wieboldt Foundation
- Chicago Community Capacity Building Initiative
- Woods Fund of Chicago
- Business and Professional People for the Public Interest
- Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Illinois Council
- United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) Local 881

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BALANCED DEVELOPMENT COALITION

CAMPAIGN REPORT

AUGUST 1, 2007

“The Balanced Development Coalition was created to give residents of Chicago’s low- income, moderate-income and gentrifying neighborhoods a powerful voice in the creation of city housing policy and a seat at the table where policy decisions are made.”

Working with City Hall / City Council

Using Local Elections

“The Balanced Development Coalition was created to give residents
of Chicago’s low- income, moderate-income and gentrifying
neighborhoods a powerful voice in the creation of city housing policy
and a seat at the table where policy decisions are made.”